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was not vacated, and it was executed in the manner prescribed
by section 675 of the Code of Civil Procedure. .As a sale
under an execution issued on a satisfied judgment is void
(Reynolds v. Lincoln, 71 Cal. 183 [9 Pac. 176, 12 Pac. 449] ),
a fortiori an order for the issuance of an execution under a
judgment which is satisfied; is likewise void. We believe it
is clear that the satisfaction here involved was a sufficient
acknowledgment by plaintiff that she had received from the
defendant all of the property to which she was entitled under the interlocutory decree of divorce. The orders for the
writ of possession and payment of the sum of $66.50 were
improper. [3] It cannot be said that the order for the
issuance of the writ of possession included a determination
that the satisfaction was not a bar thereto because, as we have
seen, it was ex parte and defendant had no opportunity to be
heard. The subject is tersely treated in Salveter v. Salveter,
11 Cal. .App. (2d) 335,337 [53 Pac. (2d) 381], as follows:
"The so-called order to issue an execution was, not a judgment on the merits against, the plaintiff. It was . . . a direction by the court to its clerk to issue the execution. It is
a fundamental rule that a writ of executio,n must be founded
on a valid and subsisting judgment' which has not been satisfied. (11 Cal. Jur. 43, and cases cited.) Payment of a judgment satisfies it and extinguishes it. "
In view of the foregoing conclusion it is unnecessary to
consider defendant '8 further contention that the interlocutory
decree did not sufficiently describe the permanent wave machine or mention the sum of $66.50.
The order appealed from denying the motion to vacate the
orders made by the trial court after the judgment was satis-fied, is reversed.
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
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NATIONAL RESERVE COMPANY OF AMERICA (a Corporation), Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN TRUST
COMP ANY OF CALIFORNIA (a Corporation), Respondent.
[1] Assignments-Formal Requisites-Written Assignments-Effect of. Power of Attorney-,-Failure to Name Assignee.-A
written instrument stating that the undersigned" hereby assigns and transfers" all his right, etc., to an investment certificate is an effective assignment, notwithstanding a power of
attorney therein authorizing an officer of a named company to
act in place of the' signer, and notwithstanding the failure to
name an assignee, where the assignee is clear from the instrument read as a whole.
[2] Id.-Formal Requisites-Consideration-Assignment for ,001lection.-An assignment of an investment certificate which
provides that the assignee is to credit all proceeds received
to the purchase price of a certificate sold by it is in essence
an assignment for collection, and it vests the legal title in
the assignee, with the right to sue thereon, whether or not
any consideration is paid therefor.
[Sa, Sb] Id.-Operation-Rights of Action-Action for Breach of
Tmst.-An assignment of all of an owner's right, title and
interest in an investment certificate without limitation, which
empowers the assignee to apply all amounts received out of
the property in a specified manner, is effective to pass to the
assignee an accrued cause of action for breach of the trust
indenture securing the certificates, where such indenture
specifically provides that ownership of a secured certificate
is a condition precedent to the maintenance of the cause of
action. This is true notwith!;tanding a, provision for allowing
a re-assignment upon determination by the assignee of his
inability to collect further proceeds or upon demand of the
assignor, where no such demand was made.
[4] Id.-Operation-In General-Instrument as Oontrolling.-In
determining what rights 01' interests pass under an assignment,
the intention of the parties as manifested in the instrument is
controlling.
McK. Dig. References: 1. Assignments, § 36; 2. Assignments,
§§ 40, 78; 3a, 3b, 5. Assignments, § 54; 4. Assignments, § 48.
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[5] Id.-Operation-Rights of Action-Accrued Causes of Action.
An unqualified assignment of a contract or chose in action
with no indication of the intent of the parties, vests in the
assignee the assigned contract or chose and all rights and
remedies incidental thereto. Unless specifically or impliedly
designated, accrued causes of action arising out of an assigned
contract, whether ex contractu or ex delicto, do not pass under the assignment if they can be asserted by the assignor independently of his continued ownership of the contract and
are not essential to a continued enforcement of the contract.
But· the rule is otherwise as to an accrued cause of action
which cannot be asserted apart from the contract out of
which it arises or is essential to a complete and adequate enforcement of the contract.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of· Los
Angeles County. Joseph W. Vickers, Judge. Reversed.
Hill, Morgan & Bledsoe, Charles P. McCarthy and William
L. Baugh, Jr., for Appellant.
Burr & Smith, William H. B. Haymond and Phillip Grey
Smith for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-The 1fetropolitan Trust Company of
California, as trustee, and the National Thrift Corporation of
America, as trustor; entered into a written trust agreement
under which the Trust Company was to hold in trust a fund
as security for the bonds, contracts, certificates, and annuity
agreements which the Thrift Company was selling as investments. The agreement required the Thrift Company to maintain in the trust fund an amount equal to not less than 110
per cent of the total aggregate principal of the outstanding
bonds and the cancellation value of the contracts and certifications, less the total amount of subsisting loans. It further
required the trustee to identify and authenticate all bonds,
contracts, certificates and annuity agreements issued by the~!
rrhrift Company, provided that the latter was under no default known to the trustee with respect to the maintenance of
the trust fund.
In 1927 Ward Esplin purchased from the Thrift Company
a $1,000 participation certificate, secured by the trust, and
5. See 3 Cal. Jur. 277; 4 Am. Jur. 304.
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identified and authenticated by the trustee. In 1932 the
Thrift Company became insolvent and a federal equity receiver was appointed to take over the trust fund. On July 8,
1933, Esplin entered into a written agreement with the National Reserve Company of America purporting to assign· all
his right, title, and interest in the participation certificate to
the Reserve Company for the purpose of permitting the latter to collect the proceeds from the certificate for him. . The
proceeds were to be applied by the Reserve Company as a
cash credit toward the purchase of one of its own investment
certificates by Esplin. The Thrift Company participation
certificate and the purported assignment were then delivered
to the receiver of the trust fund by the National Reserve Company. Since the value of the trust fund had fallen below· the
110 per cent required by the trust agreement the liquidation
value of the certificate was substantially less than the stated
cancellation value. In 1936 the National Reserve Company
instituted the present action against the Metropolitan Trust
Company alleging that it had violated the trust agreement at
various times by identifying and authenticating certificates
issued by the Thrift Company with knowledge that the value
of the collateral deposited in the trust fund was less than
the required 110 per cent. Esplin was not joined in the
suit. This actioll, for the benefit of plaintiff and all other
holders of such contracts and certificates, is representative in
character and seeks to hold the defendant trustee accountable
for the difference between the actual value of the fund and
the value at which it should have been maintained.
At the opening of the trial it was stipulated that prior to
the consideration of any other issue evidence should be taken
to determine whether any right to sue upon the cause of
action ever vested in plaintiff. After receiving evidence on
that issue, the trial court found that Esplin had not assigned
the certificate to plaintiff for a valuable consideration and
that plaintiff was not the owner thereof. It also found. that
the cause of action sued upon by plaintiff was never assigned
or transferred to it by Esplin. The present appeal was taken
from the judgment entered by the trial court pursuant to
these findings.
The issues are: (1) Did the instrument of JUly 8, 1933,
constitute a valid assignment of the participation certificate
by Esplin to plaintiff, vesting the legal ownership in plaintiff Y

830

NATIONAL R. CO.

V.

METROPOLITAN T. CO.

[17 C. (2d)

(2) If so, did it transfer to plaintiff the right to sue for a
breach of the trust agreement occu,rring prior to the assignment?
The written instrument of July 8, 1933, provided as follows:"WHEREAS, the undersigned hl:!.ving purchased of the
National Reserve Company of America one of its investment
certificates, hereafter referred to as certificate, and
"WHEREAS, the undersigned is the owner of NATIONAL - THRIFT CERTIFICATE #136B CLASS B
SERIES F having an estimated value of $835.10, and hereinafter referred to as property, and
"WHEREAS, the undersigned is desirous of having the
cash value of said property applied, at the earliest possible
moment, as a cash interest-bearing credit on said certificate.
"NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration that National Reserve Company agrees to give an immediate conditional credit
(not a credit on my certificate) of 100 per cent of the above
estimated value, and of the company's further agreement to
convert said credit to a cash interest-bearing credit on the
certificate immediately as received by it in the form of cash
or its equivalent in acceptable first mortgages, and that .it
further agrees to immediately pass to the cashable interestbearing credit on said certificate all such amounts received
by it from or out of said property; the undersigned hereby_
assigns and transfers, for the purposes hereinabove stated and
for none other, all his right, title and interest of, in and to
the hereinabove described property, and hereby constitutes,
appoints and empowers any duly qualified officer of said National -Reserve Company in his name, place and stead, and
as his attorney in fact, for said purposes.
"PROVIDED, that, at any time upon the determination
and conclusion that it is or will be unable to collect further
proceeds out of said property, said National Reserve Company
may, or upon the written request at any time of the undersigned shall, re-assign and transfer to the undersigned, said
property depleted by the amount of the aforesaid receipts
arising out of said property and credited as aforesaid to said
certificate, whereupon this agreement shall become automatically terminated and cancelled.
"Executed and acknowledged by Ward H. Esplin.
July 8, 1933."
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[1] There is no basis for the trial court's finding that
Esplin did not assign the ·certificate to plaintiff. The evidence is -clear that Esplin signed the instrument. Its language is that of an assignment, the granting clause rea.ding
in part: " . . . the undersigned hereby assigns and trans! ers
... all of his right, title and interest in and to the hereinabove property ... " (italics added), and it is not less an
assignment because of its power of attorney provision. (Jackson v. Deatwille Holding Co., 219 Cal. 498 [27 Pac. (2d)
643].) Read in its entirety, the instrument admits of no
other construction than that plaintiff is the assignee despite
defendant's objection that the instrument fails to name an
assignee. Otherwise, for example, it would be impossible for
plaintiff to re-assign the certificate pursuant to -the provision
in the last .paragraph that" . . . said National Reserve Com- ,
pany may . . . re-assign . . . said property.. . -".
[2] The contention that the assignment is void for lack of
consideration likewise cannot be sustained. Since the instrument provides that plaintiff is to credit all proceeds received
by it to the purchase price of an investment certificate sold
by it to Esplin, the assignment is in essence one for collection.
It is well established that an' assignment of a chose in action
for collection vests the legal title in the assignee whether or not
any consideration is paid therefor. In such case the assignee
may maintain a sl1it thereon in his own name, even though
the assignor retains an equitable interest in the thing assigned. (Greig v. Riordan, 99 Cal. 316 [33 Pac. 913] ; Morrison v. Veach, 190 -Cal. 507 [213 Pac. 945] ; Cohn v. Thompson, 128 Cal. App. (Supp.) 783 [16 Pac. (2d) 3641.) The
instrument in question therefore constitutes a valid assignment of· the certificate .to plaintiff.
[3a] There remains the question whether the cause of action for breach of the trust indenture passed to plaintiff- with
the assignment of .the certificate. There is no limitation, express or implied, in the instrument to support the trial court's
conclusion that the assignment was designed solely to au~
thorize the collection by plaintiff of such dividends as it
might receive on the certificate through a liquidation of the
existing trust collateral. Plaintiff is empowered to apply to
the purchase price of its investment certificate on behalf of
the assignor "all such amounts· received by it from or out
of said [assigned] property". The words of the granting
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clause in no way restrict the source of such collections. Defendants rely upon the introductory clause of the instrument
_which reads: "WHEREAS, the undersigned is desirous of
. having the cash value of said property applied, at. the earliest
. possible moment, as a cash interest-bearing credit on said
certificate". (Italics added.) They urge that the term
"cash value" refers to the cancellation v,alue of the certificate
in liquidation and thus indicates that the assignment was
,restricted to the collection of dividends in such. liquidation.
The granting clause of the assignment, however, transfers all
of Esplin's right, title and interest without limitation, and
is controlling over ambiguous recitals in the preamble. (Bing
, v. Bowers, 26 Fed. (2d) 1017.) Moreover, plaintiff as an
assignee for collection should collect all amounts recoverable
on the certificate, and the cash value of the certificate would
therefore include not only the amounts available in the trust
estate for its cancellation; but in addition, any amounts which
may be obtained by bringing suit against one whose wrongdoing has depleted the available funds and thereby reduced
the value of the certificate.
Defendants contend that the provision in the assignment
which allows plaintiff to re-assign the certificate upon determining that it is unable to collect further proceeds and
enables Esplin to demand a re-assignment of the certificate
at will indicates that the cause of action was' not intended
to pass under the assignment. Esplin, however, has made no
, such demand for re-assignment, and the provision limits only
. the possible duration of the assignment and not the extent
of the rights transferred thereby.
The statement in the assignment that it was made "for
the purposes hereinabove stated, and for none other" constitutes not a limitation upon the rights assigned, but simply
a requirement that the moneys collected be applied to the
purchase price of the investment certificate as provided- in
the first paragraphs of the assignment. The clause limits not
what plaintiff may collect, but plaintiff's subsequent disposition of what is collected.
[4] In determining what rights or interests pass under an
assignment, the intention of the parties as. manifested in the
instrument is controlling.. (See cases cited in 5 C. J. 949.)
[5]. An unqualified assignment of a contract or chose in
action" however, with no indication of the intent of the par-
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ties, vests in the assignee the assigned contract or chose and
all rights and remedies incidental thereto. (See cases cited
in 3 Cal. Jur. 277.) These incidental rights include certain
ancillary causes of action arising out of the subject of the
assignment' and accruing before the assignment is made.
Unless an assignment specifically or impliedly designates
them, accrued causes of action arising out of an' assigned contract, whether ex contractu or ex delicto, do not pass under
the assignment as incidental to the contract if they can be
asserted by the assignor independently of his continued ownership of the contract and are not· essential to a continued
enforcement of the contract. (Regan Vapor~Engine 00. v.
Pacific Gas-Engine 00.,49 Fed. 68, 1 C.' C. A. 169] ; Schaffer
v. Vandewater ill 00., 160 App. Div. 803 [145 N. Y. Supp.
769]; Wasson v. Taylor, 191 Ark. 659 [87 S. W. (2d) 63];
Fox v. Hirschfeld, 157 App. Div.364 [142 N. Y. Supp. 261];
Steele v. Brazier, 139 Mo. App. 319 [123 S. W. 477] ; Robinson v. Saxon Mills, 124 S. C. 415 [117 S. E. 424] ; Morris v.
McOulloch,83 Pa. St. 34; [contra, Jackson v. Meinhardt, 99
Cal. App. 283 (278 Pac. 462)].)
If, however, an accrued cause of action cannot be asserted
apart from the contract out of which it arises or is essential
to a complete and adequate enforcement of .the contract, it
passes with an assignment' of the contract as. an incident
thereof. Thus, the assignm.ent of' a contract passes from assignor to assignee an accrued cause of action for rescission
(Latimer v. Oapay Valley Land 00., ] 37 Cal. 286 [70 Pac•
82] ; National Pacific Oil 00. V~ Watson, 184 Cal. 216 [193'
Pac. 133] ; Sherman ·V. International Life Ins. 00., 291 Mo.
139 [236S. W. 634]), or for reformation (Beck-Brown Realty
00. v. Liberty Bell Ins. 00., 137 Misc. 263 [241 N. Y. Supp.
727) ], and a creditor 'sassignee acquires the right to set aside
a prior fraudulent conveyance by the debtor. (Emmons v.
Barton, 109 Cal. 662 [42 Pac. 303] ; Billingsleyv. Olelland,
41 W. Va. 234 [23 S. E. 8]2].) As a corollary,ifan assignor
by express provision of a contract is denied the right to assert
an accrued cause of action after he has assigned away his interest in the contract, the right to sue passes to his assignee.
There would otherwise be no one to enforce the right.
[3b] The trust indenture, upon which the present action
is based, specifically provides that ownership of a certificate
secured by the agreement is a condition precedent to the main17
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tenance of a cause of action for violation of a covenant contained therein. The assertion of the cause of action is thus
dependent upon ownership of the certificate. All right, title
and interest in such certificate has been assigned to plaintiff.
Only by virtue of its transfer to the plaintiff could the cause
of action continue to exist. Furthermore, plaintiff as an
assignee for collection must secure the largest obtainable
amount, and to the end of complete and adequate enforcement
of the contract must be able to sue the delinquent trustee for
a restitution that will enhance the value of the certificate.
The judgment is reversed.
Carter, J., Curtis, J., and 'Shenk, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied May 22,
194L

[L. A. No. 17756. In Bank.-April 24, 1941.)

ADALYN B. BITTINQ.iE'R, Appellant, v. NEW YORK
LIFE_ INSURANCE COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent.
[1] Insurance-Waiver or Estoppel-Acts Constituting-Acceptanceand Retention of Premiums.-Any provision of a life
insurance policy for immediate lapse upon non-payment of
interest on a policy loan is waived by the acceptance of a
premium payment. The company. cannot at the' same time
accept the premium .payment and declare the policy lapsed,
nor can it lapse automatically at that time.
[2] Id.-Re-scission-Notice of Cancellation and Return of Premium-Nonacceptance-Reapplication of Dividend.~An attempted rescission by an insurance company after the acceptance of a premium payment, by means of an offer to refund
the premium paid in excess of the dividend (a minimum
part of the premium payment), and an application of the
dividend to the payment of texm insurance, is ineffectual
where the refund was not accepted, and where the at-tempted reapplication of the dividend' was made not only

2. See 14 Cal.' Jur. 439; 29 Am. Jur. 268.
McK. Dig. References: 1. Insurance, § 147 (5); 2. Insurance,
§ 113; 3. Insurance, § 74; 4a, 4b, 40, 5a, 5b. Insurance, § 92.
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without the knowledge or consent of the insured but also
after his death.
[3] Id.-The Contract-Interpretation-Duration and Termination of Risk-Automatic Term Insurance.~Under a provision in an insurance policy that in case of default in payment
of premium or interest when there is a debt to the company
insurance for a specified amount will· automl\tically continue
as term insurance for such time as an excess of three-fourths
of the reserve over the indebtedness will purchase, the Automatic term insurance cannot extend the policy to a given
date where notwithstanding the increase of reserve value as
shown by the table, there is, by reason of interest, an indebtedness in excess of the reserve value, with the result that
there is no surplus reserve on which to base any extended
term insurance.
[43., 4b, 4c] Id.-Premiums-Forfeiture for Nonpayment-Grace
Period.-A provision in an insurance policy that if any premium or interest is not paid when due, the company will "restore" .the policy as of the date of nonpayment, .on payment
within one month thereafter, does not, by the use of the word
"restore," imply an immediate forfeiture. Although the language is not that of the modern grace provision, it serves
to prevent a lapse of the policy immediately, and extends its
effectiveness for the period of one month.
[5a,5b] Id.-Premiums-Forfeiture for Nonpayment-Necessity
for Express Provision.-The rule that forfeitures· are not
favored is particularly true of insurance contracts, and a
forfeiture will be permitted only when expressed in the
policy in clear and unmistakable terms.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Myron Westover, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Joe Crider, Jr., and Clarence B. Runkle for Appellant.
Meserve, Mumper & Hughes and E. Avery Crary for Respondent.
CURTIS, J.---This is an appeal from a judgment in favor
of defendant insurance company in an action by plaintiff,
.as beneficiary under a life insurance policy, to recover the
death benefit provided therein.
On April 1, 1905, a $20,000 life insurance policy was issued
by respondent company on the life of appellant's husband.

